With the growing use of discrete choice experiments (DCEs) in health workforce research, the reliability of elicited job preferences is a growing concern. We provide the first empirical evidence on the temporal stability of such preferences using a unique longitudinal survey of Australian nursing students and graduate nurses. The respondents completed DCEs on nursing positions in two survey waves. Each position is described by salary and 11 non-salary attributes, and the two waves are spaced 15 months apart on average. Between the waves, most final-year students finished their degrees and started out as graduate nurses. Thus, the survey covers a long timespan that includes an important period of career transition. The relative importance of different job attributes appears stable enough to support the use of DCEs to identify key areas of policy intervention. There is virtually no change in the groupings of influential job characteristics. Conclusions regarding the stability of willingness-to-pay, however, are different because of unstable preferences for salary. The instability of preferences for salary was also found previously in the context of comparing alternative elicitation methods. This prompts us to push for further work on the reliability of stated preferences over monetary attributes.
INTRODUCTION
Recent years have seen an increasing demand for empirical evidence to guide the recruitment and retention of healthcare professionals. Household surveys and registry data, however, do not often provide rich enough information to analyse trade-offs across a wide range of job attributes. A growing body of evidence comes from discrete choice experiments (DCEs), with the World Health Organization and the World Bank now promoting the DCE approach (Ryan et al., 2012; Araújo and Maeda, 2013) . This approach collects stated choices among job profiles to elicit preferences for job attributes. The Australian DCE study of Doiron et al. (2014) , for example, is the first study from a developed country to provide evidence on trade-offs across several nursing job attributes, which have not been previously analysed together because of data limitations. Other recent DCE studies include Kolstad (2011) on Tanzanian clinical officers, Sivey et al. (2012) on Australian doctors and Holte et al. (2015) on Norwegian doctors.
The usefulness of DCE studies depends on whether they capture fundamental aspects of preferences that can inform future decisions, making temporal stability an important reliability criterion. A handful of studies have tested for temporal stability explicitly. Earlier studies find stable preferences for medical services (Bryan et al., 2000; San Miguel et al., 2002; Salkeld et al., 2005; Skjoldborg et al., 2009 ) and social care outcomes (Ryan et al., 2006) but, as Liebe et al. (2012) point out, their study designs may be conducive to carry-over effects because the repeat DCE occurs soon (2 weeks to 4 months) after the initial DCE. Recent studies in environmental valuation suggest that the timespan between DCEs indeed matters. Two 6-month studies (Czajkowski et al., 2014; Rigby et al., 2015) support stability, while two 1-year studies (Liebe et al., 2012; Schaafsma et al., 2014) present mixed evidence. The marketing study of Islam and Louviere (2015) on household consumables (e.g. toothpastes), however, finds that stability may hold over 2 years when DCE profiles describe familiar objects. This paper is the first DCE study to investigate the temporal stability of stated job preferences. Exploring temporal stability over a long timespan is important in health workforce research, where DCEs often recruit prospective workforce cohorts to aid forward-looking policy formulation. For instance, Blaauw et al. (2010) , Kolstad (2011) and Holte et al. (2015) administer DCEs involving entry-level positions to students of professional degree programmes, and Sivey et al. (2012) and Pedersen and Gyrd-Hansen (2014) administer DCEs involving specialist positions to non-specialist doctors. While prospective and current employees often have opportunities to experience various job attributes, job decisions are inherently more complex than the purchase of household consumables. Assuming temporal stability over a long period without relevant evidence may lead to erroneous policy decisions, especially when the period in question involves career transition. As Islam and Louviere (2015) review, behavioural and psychological research contends that preferences encompass constructed, as opposed to inherently stable, components that vary with external conditions. Qualitative research findings show that the health workers' assessment of job aspects varies within a few months into the first employment (Kelly and Ahern, 2009) , suggesting that career transition may be one such condition. Whether job preferences remain stable, and if not, to what extent instability alters conclusions from an initial DCE, are questions that need to be addressed empirically.
We analyse a longitudinal survey of nursing students and junior nurses who completed two waves of DCEs involving entry-level nursing positions in Australia.
1 The two waves were spaced at least a full year apart and 15 months on average, meaning that our study covers a longer timespan than all but one previous study (Islam and Louviere, 2015) . Many of our respondents are making the transition from study to work, potentially learning a lot about performing nursing jobs.
DATA AND METHODS
The underlying survey recruited 628 respondents during 2008-2010, from 3-year Bachelor of Nursing programmes at the University of Technology Sydney and the University of New England in Australia.
2 This paper focuses on 241 respondents who participated in DCEs involving entry-level nursing jobs in two consecutive waves.
3 They completed the first-wave (W1) DCE between September 2009 and July 2011, when 27%, 32% and 41% of them were third-year, second-year and first-year students, respectively; and the second-wave (W2) DCE between April 2011 and August 2012, when 35% of them were graduate nurses while 34%, 29% and 2% were third-year, second-year and first-year students, respectively. Each respondent's completion dates were spaced at least a full year apart and 15 months on average.
The W1 DCE requires each respondent to complete eight choice scenarios. Each scenario asks for the best and the worst out of three jobs simultaneously, thereby eliciting a full preference ordering. The jobs are differentiated by weekly salary (four possible levels) and 11 non-salary attributes (two possible levels each): the online appendix provides details on the attribute levels. The W2 DCE is identical, barring two differences. First, the four underlying salary levels change from f$800; $950; $1100; $1250g to f$900; $1100; $1300; $1500g, mirroring the updated pay scale for entry-level nursing jobs in 2011. Second, the respondents are not required to complete all eight scenarios, although almost everyone (234 out of 241) voluntarily completed all.
Most DCEs prompt choices from available alternatives, instead of full preference orderings. 4 To obtain more directly comparable results, we focus on modelling which of the three jobs is the best. In the random utility maximisation framework, the chosen and best alternatives are conceptually equivalent, because the decision maker is assumed to choose their best alternative. Caparrós et al. (2008) and Akaichi et al. (2013) test this equivalence by administering the same DCE using both elicitation formats and find supporting evidence.
Our analysis follows the usual random utility maximisation framework. The utility that person n derives from job j in choice senario t is U nj t Dˇ0 nt x nj t C " nj t whereˇn t D˛n C ı n wave2 nt.
(1)
x nj t is a vector of 12 attributes,ˇn t is a conformable vector of utility coefficients, wave2 nt is a dummy variable that equals 1 for choice scenarios from Wave 2 and error term " nj t is i.i.d. Type 1 extreme value.ˇn t comprises n that captures the baseline preferences in Wave 1 and ı n that captures the deviations from the baseline in Wave 2. We accommodate interpersonal taste heterogeneity nonparametrically by specifying a finite-mixture or 'latent class' logit (LCL) model (Train, 2008) : Â n D .˛n; ı n / can be one of C classes or types of preferences, Â 1 ; Â 2 ; : : : ; Â C , with the population share of class c being Pr.Â n D Â c / D c . 5 Our discussion focuses on the three-class LCL model that estimates Â 1 ; Â 2 ; Â 3 ; 1 and 2 , normalising 3 D 1 2 1 .
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All non-salary attributes are dummy-coded. Salary is log-transformed to allow for the diminishing marginal utility of money. Figure 1 plots the W2 coefficients against the W1 coefficients. They are the population mean utility weights, E.˛n C ı n / D P 3 cD1 c .˛c C ı c / in W2 and E.˛n/ D P 3 cD1 c˛c in W1. To facilitate interpretation, we multiply the coefficient on ln.salary/ by ln.1:6/ and plot the resulting utility weight on 60% extra salary: in W1 (W2), the largest salary level of $1250 ($1500) is 56% (67%) above the base level of $800 ($900).
Most coefficients are clustered around the 45 ı line, implying similar magnitudes over time. Some show marked deviations from it, however, especially the weights on better hospital equipment and 60% extra salary. Statistically, 5 out of 12 coefficients show significant changes, including these two. As environmental valuation studies with the longest timespan (Liebe et al., 2012; Schaafsma et al., 2014) , we find evidence against the complete stability of utility weights.
The relative valuation of job aspects, nevertheless, seems stable enough to allow its use in identifying the priority areas of intervention. Whether Figure 1 is read horizontally or vertically, attribute labels are encountered in a similar order, implying a similar relative valuation over time. The magnitude-based rankings of the coefficients in Table I , indeed, show that 8 of 12 attributes display no or one-place change in rankings. The composition of four groups of three attributes based on W1 rankings remains unchanged in W2, except 'well equipped' and 'well staffed' that swap their membership in the fourth-sixth place group and the seventh-ninth All money metric measures of better non-salary attributes can be expected to be influenced by the marked decline in the utility of extra salary in Figure 1 . We consider the willingness-to-pay (WTP) or a fraction of salary that person n is willing to give up for an improvement in attribute k. The WTP equals 1 exp. Â nk =Â nS /, given coefficients Â nk on attribute k and Â nS on ln.salary/.
9 In the LCL model, the population mean WTP (MWTP) is obtained by averaging class-specific WTP using class shares as weights. Figure 2 reports MWTP in each wave. We also compute MWTP for a counterfactual case that combines Â nk from W2 and Â nS from W1. As expected, MWTP in W2 tends to exceed MWTP in W1. But MWTP in the counterfactual case shows much less pronounced deviations and suggest that the instability in MWTP is driven primarily by the declining utility of extra salary. Schaafsma et al. (2014) define the average transfer error of MWTP as the average percentage change in MWTP between waves. Our average transfer error is 59% between W2 and W1 and 11% between the counterfactual case and W1. The latter compares well against the 35% in Schaafsma et al. (2014) . Our own computation for other studies reporting MWTP finds 23% in Liebe et al. (2012) , whose study rejected the temporal stability of utility weights as Schaafsma et al. did, and 36% in Skjoldborg et al. (2009) and 4% in Czajkowski et al. (2014) whose studies did not.
10; 11
In sum, the average transfer error in MWTP for nursing job attributes would have been towards the lower end of what previous studies have found for other types of attributes, if not for the instability of preferences for salary. Before concluding, we provide further thoughts on this instability.
To ensure that the declining utility of extra salary is a feature of the underlying data, not that of our ln.salary/ specification, a robustness check is performed. We modify the LCL model earlier by replacing ln.salary/ with six dummy variables (three for each wave) capturing all salary increments. The online appendix reports the results, which show that a given amount of extra salary in W2 yields either the same or less utility gain than a smaller amount in W1. The online appendix also reports specifications that incorporate observed heterogeneity in utility weights using individual characteristics. In general, the utility from extra salary and other attributes does not vary systematically across career stage groups (graduates and different years of study). This may reflect a good understanding of actual nursing jobs by students acquired through the practicum component of the Bachelor of Nursing program, which lessens the possible influence of career progression as an external shock to preferences. The hours spent in practicum placements during the 3-year programme are substantial: 120 in year 1, 320 in year 2 and 400 in year 3.
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One obvious and potentially testable confounding factor is the 'price vector effects' (Hanley et al., 2005) , which arise when elicited preferences are sensitive to the levels of a monetary attribute used in the DCE design. As noted, four salary levels in our design have increased for every respondent between W1 and W2, to keep the choice scenarios plausible in relation to the updated pay schedule. Distinguishing the price vector effects from the temporal shift in preferences for salary requires randomly allocating respondents to two different salary vector treatments within the same wave; this would be a useful avenue to pursue in future work.
If present, sizable price vector effects would have implications beyond explaining the temporal instability of preferences for salary. Specifying a small number of salary levels is a common feature of DCEs in health workforce research (e.g. Blaauw et al. (2010) , Kolstad (2011) and Sivey et al. (2012) consider four levels), and such effects would limit the external validity of the resulting WTP estimates. Of three previous studies that have tested for the price vector effects in the contexts of cervical cancer screening (Ryan and Wordsworth, 2000) and environmental valuation (Hanley et al., 2005; Carlsson and Martinsson, 2008) , only one study (Carlsson and Martinsson, 2008 ) reports significant effects.
The findings of our earlier study (Yoo and Doiron, 2013) suggest that the robust elicitation of preferences for salary could be an inherently difficult task. In that study, we compare the DCE earlier against another type of DCE that presents respondents with only one nursing job profile at a time, asking them to state the best and worst aspects of that particular job. The same respondents complete both types of DCEs, which use the same W1 salary vector. Weights on non-salary attributes are comparable across the two types of DCEs, but again, the salary weights differ. These results, along with the present analysis, prompt us to recommend further work on the stability of preferences for monetary attributes generally.
CONCLUSION
This paper is the first study on the temporal stability of stated job preferences, an important reliability criterion for the intended policy use of a growing number of DCE studies in health workforce research. Statistically, we find stable preference parameters for only 7 of 12 job attributes in our DCE. However, the relative importance of different attributes to job choices is stable enough to support the use of DCEs to identify priority areas of intervention. Our conclusion regarding the stability of WTP for non-salary attributes is more tentative. The average transfer error in our WTP estimates is larger than what temporal stability studies in other contexts have found. But this discrepancy is mostly explained by the instability of preferences for salary: in the absence of it, the average transfer error is 11%, well within the lower end of what other studies have found. We believe that a research agenda focusing on the difficulty of eliciting preferences for monetary characteristics may be warranted.
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